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“What’s the difference between kinky and pervert
­
ed?” the tendentious joke goes: “Kinky means using
 a feather; perverted means using the whole chicken.”
 The satisfied laugh or groan elicited by the joke
 depends on the listener’s anticipated (and, for most of
 us understandable) distaste at the thought of having
 sex with a chicken — either functionally or proxi
­mately. But the difference between kinky and per
­verse can be dangerous as well 
as
 distasteful, for the  
line separating one from the other demarcates zones
 of habitability: one feather is okay, but the whole
 chicken is not. Jokes reinforce the line between hab
­itable and uninhabitable, but depending on the time,
 place, and persons involved, disrespect for that line
 can turn deadly. When JoAnn Wypijewski went to
 Laramie, Wyoming, after Matthew Shepard’s mur
­der, she was told a different joke: “‘You can have sex
 with a sheep in Wyoming, just don’t tie the shepard
 to the fence’” (70). Gallows or humor?
While crossing into the zone of uninhabitability
 
may elicit a range of responses from laughter to exe
­cution, the line that marks the exit from habitable
 zones shifts with time, culture, situation, and thus is
 always determined by society, by the shared under
­standing of the audience. The first joke tacitly sug
­gests that utilizing a chicken for sex makes 
a
 body  
perverted; in fact, it is not the presence or absence of
 the chicken but the audience’s laughter that does so.
 It is thus entirely possible for a body to cross the
 threshold into abjection and not be aware of the trans
­gression until the audience’s response indicates a line
 has been crossed. Critical theories informed by the
1
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de Saussure, Lacan, and Foucault — work that powerfully called into  
question Cartesian models of subject formation — has enabled scrutiny of these
 lines, both their construction and maintenance. The language I deploy
 
here —  
"abjection,” “zones of habitability” — reveals my indebtedness to certain theo
­rists engaged in this kind of scrutiny, particularly the work of Judith Butler in
 Bodies that Matter, Interrogating the formation and the materiality of the sub
­ject, Butler
 
finds that  the production of subjects “requires the simultaneous pro ­
duction of a domain of abject beings” (3). Abjection is not simply a matter of
 othering, it “designates a degraded or cast out status within the terms of social
­ity” (243). Today in the United States, zones of abjection include those states
 of being that are cast out from the norm and that invite violent consequences:
 the physically or mentally disabled body as well as the black or homosexual
 body. The subject “fantasizes” that the abject constitutes a threat to its own
 integrity: “I would rather die than do or be that!” (Butler 243). But the threat
 is just that, a fantasy; the iteration of norms through utterances or acts (jokes
 or executions) maintains that fantasy by violently casting out the threatening
 body or bodies. Fortunately for those of us who live close to the fine (and I
 would say that is each of us some times), critical inquiry into the economic, sex
­ual, and- historical constructions of the subject has attended to how the lines
 separating subject from abject are generated and sustained. However, it has not
 examined closely enough its own participation in the reinforcement of those
 fines. When criticism relies on the same shared understandings as the joke
 about the chicken, it works to maintain those lines. One of the most damag
­ing and most commonly shared understandings assumes that fear is the “nor
­mal” response to abjection.
Criticism of the brief altercation between the Pardoner and the Host at the
 
end of Chaucer’s The Pardoner
'
s Tale provides a useful heuristic device for exam ­
ining such shared assumptions. In The Canterbury Tales, the Prioress’ odd
 brooch and even the Friar’s cupidity, however contemptible, still fall within the
 range of habitable, acceptable space. They remain in the company of pilgrims;
 neither is singled out for particular castigation. Only the Pardoner crosses the
 line into abjection, an excess made manifest not by his own actions but by the
 Host’s vehement response. The scene I am using takes only sixty lines and
 occurs almost as an afterthought to The Pardoner
'
s Tale, At the end of his tale,  
the Pardoner invites the company to purchase absolution from him, either for
­getting he has already revealed his game or assuming
 
he is good enough to dupe  
even these pilgrims who are aware of it. Of all the company, the Pardoner
 invites the Host first: “I rede that oure Hoost heere shal bigynne / For he is
 moost envoluped in synne” (lines 941-2). The Host denies the Pardoner’s offer:
 “‘Nay, nay!’ quod he, ‘thanne have I Cristes curs! . . . /
 
Thou woldest make me  
kisse thy olde breech, / And swere it were a relyk of a seint, / Though it were
 with thy fundament depeint!”’ (946, 948-50). The Host rightly specifies the
 consequences of paying for absolution without
 
true confession: not redemption  
but “Cristes curs.” And he further exposes the Pardoner’s game. These are not
 saints’ relics, but the Pardoner’s own relics, collected from wherever, possibly
 even from his own ass. But the Host follows his refusal with a threat: “I wolde
 I hadde thy coilions in myn hond / . . . Lat kutte hem of” (952, 954). When
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he follows his refusal with a violent threat, the Host participates in the itera
­
tion of a norm that works to cast out the Pardoner; the threat signifies that the
 Pardoner has crossed a line, the consequences for which are violent.
The short altercation between the Host and Pardoner has received little
 
critical attention until recently when interest in subjectivity and abjection has
 rendered the Pardoner
'
s contestable morality and sexuality  irresistible. While a  
number of recent studies offer intelligent, alternative explanations of what
 makes the Pardoner’s offer so unpardonable, on one point they agree: the Host
 threatens the Pardoner because he fears him. Yet if the scene — replete with
 ambiguities and laden with emotion — begs for an analysis of
 
its emotion, it  
provides almost no information about either the Pardoner’s or the Host’s emo
­tional state; thus we can never know what the Host feels. Instead of acknowl
­edging the text’s silence, though, many critics interpolate their own culturally
 inflected understandings of emotion into the text, a practice that is, of course,
 defensible on the grounds that any act of interpretation is also an act of inter
­polation, but my argument 
is
 that an ethical reading will consider the implica ­
tions of positing one emotion over another.
A quick survey of several recent studies reveals the tendency to posit unin
­
terrogated assumptions about the Host’s reaction to the Pardoner: Monica
 McAlpine characterizes the Host’s response as a reaction to 
a
 threat (17); H.  
Marshall Leicester claims that the Pardoner embodies the “horror of existence”
 (44); Allen Frantzen discusses the Host’s “frightened and frightening respons
­es” (144); and Carolyn Dinshaw speculates that “[p]erhaps, sensing something
 of the Pardoner’s lack, the Host fears for his own manhood” (163). All of these
 writers rest their logic on this notion of fear but fail to explain how they know
 it 
is
 fear that the Host feels. Dinshaw even acknowledges her reliance on a par ­
ticular interpretation of the Host’s emotional state: “Harry’s response power
­fully corroborates the associations I have been pointing
 
to here” (168). The text  
of the tale gives little indication of precisely what the Host feels. The only
 overt mention of emotion comes at the end of the scene when the Host says he
 will not “pleye” with any “angry man” (951). This refers to the Pardoner’s emo
­tional state, not Harry
 
Bailey’s, though it is just as likely that the Host responds  
out of anger rather than fear. Any interpretation of the Host’s emotions would
 require a justification based on careful reading and logic. Yet these writers, who
 are impressively careful in their research and in the construction of their argu
­ments, assume they know the Host’s emotions but refrain from providing any
 evidence for those assumptions. Even if
 
they are correct that the Host fears,  
they would need either to theorize or historicize their assumptions about the
 Host’s emotions. They do neither. Nor do they consider that the superlative
­ly masculine Harry Bailey threatens violence out of an aggressive impulse
 instead of
 
a fearful one. As a result, their arguments finally participate in and  
reinforce a shared understanding that abjection provokes fear. Such a shared
 understanding works to establish fear as an essential response to abjection — an
 essentialization that poses the possibility of violent consequences for abjected
 bodies.




 “The Pardoner’s Homosexuality and How it Matters.”
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The description of the Pardoner in The General Prologue certainly contributes
 
to McAlpine’s interpretation of the Pardoner as a homosexual. The text indi
­cates an ambivalent sexuality when the narrator conjectures that the Pardoner
 is either already castrated or effeminate: “I trowe he were a geldyng or a mare”
 (General Prologue 691). Where evidence of his masculinity should be — in his
 lap — he has instead a fungible penis, a “male” in which he keeps his “relics.”
 Thus, at the end of his tale, when the Pardoner invites the Host over to “kisse
 the relikes,” he implicitly invites the Host to kiss the “male” part in his lap, an
 invitation to fellatio. In case the Host should be too dull to understand such a
 subtle come-on, the Pardoner ends his request by directing the Host to
 “‘Unbokele thy purs,”’ inviting the Host not just to part with his money (con
­tained within the purse) but to expose himself sexually (Pardoners Tale 945);
 “purs” appears as a gloss for penis (specifically 
as
 an instrument for sexual plea ­
sure) in the Wife’s prologue (44b). The Pardoner’s offer thus contains a fairly
 explicit sexual invitation. While it would be wrong to ignore the sexual come-
 on in the Pardoner’s offer, it is equally wrong to interpret this as a scene of
 homosexuality and homophobia. Allen Frantzen appropriately remarks on the
 ahistorical assumptions of McAlpine’s argument: “It is not necessary to insist
 that [the Pardoner] is homosexual or to identify the Pardoner as gay; to do so
 
is
 to assume (without evidence) that such a category constitutes medieval iden ­
tity when it seems, rather, to describe acts performed by certain persons that
 contributed to their identity but did not define them” (133). While it’s possi
­ble that the Pardoner’s offer constitutes a threat, it is far more likely a spiritual
 than a physical or sexual one.
When Monica McAlpine argues for the Pardoner’s homosexuality, she
 
almost assuredly does so out of concern for justice and from an antihomopho-
 bic stance. But if the Pardoner’s sexuality matters, then so does the Host’s
 response. If she were right about the Pardoner, then assuming the Host 
is homophobic serves to establish a tradition of fearing homosexuals; the impli
­cation is that people have always feared the homosexual — an essentializing
 move. The danger in McAlpine’s argument lies in its perpetuation of fear as an
 understood response to abjected bodies, in this case, the homosexual body.
 Though Frantzen and others address other, more historically accurate readings
 of the Pardoner’s abjection, they still assume the Pardoner incites fear when
 they participate in a
 
“shared understanding” that the abject is to-be-feared (just  
as the guy with the chicken is to-be-laughed-at). While these readings unset
­tle our understanding of medieval subjectivity, their unquestioning assumptions
 about the scene’s emotional content reinforce the notion that fear 
is
 the under ­
stood (read: approved) response to abjection.
In The Pardoners Tale and other texts, the impulse to attribute negative
 
responses to fear is understandable enough. In Powers of
 
Horror, Julia Kristeva  
argues that, when “[c]onfronted with states of distress that were evoked for us
 by the child who makes himself heard but is incapable of making himself
 understood, we, adults, use the word Tear’” (33). In the same way, critics
 attribute negative reactions in texts to fear: the child cannot articulate the cause
 of distress, the text does not. As observing adults or observant readers we can
 only guess, and we guess fear. While I am indebted to Kristeva’s understand
­
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ing of abjection for my argument, her explanation of the interrelation between
 
fearfulness and abjection 
is
 less useful. She asks “why is it phobia that best  
allows one to tackle the matter of relation to the object? Why fear and object?”
 (33). But she does not find a clear answer to her own question. Referring to
 Otto Rank’s comments on birth trauma, Kristeva concludes:
Fear, therefore, in a first sense, could be the upsetting of a
 
bio-drive balance.  
The constitution of the object relation might then be a reiteration of fear,
 alternating with optimal but precarious states of balance. Fear and object
 proceed together until the one represses the other. But in which one of us
 
is
 that fully successful?
(33-4)
The final question in the above quotation turns, the text away from an inquiry
 
into why fear and toward an inquiry into the machinations of fear. The two sen
­tences that ought to answer the question, though, are plagued by uncertain
 verbs: “Could,” “might be.” More importantly, an inquiry into why it’s fear
 begs the question of whether it’s fear. When the text remains silent, neither
 naming the emotions at play nor providing enough physical description to infer
 the emotions (racing heart, sweating, and so on), we finally cannot know. Since
 even precise physical descriptions can be misleading (“a racing heart,” or
 “sweating” might just as easily describe excitement 
as
 fear), even hard evidence  
becomes suspect and calls into question the possibility of interpreting emotion
 at all.. What is possible, however, 
is
 to examine the implications of overriding  
our epistemological limitations.
In her work on abjection, Kristeva explores the interrelation between fear
­
fulness and abjection, but the cultural implications of interpreting emotions are
 made clearer by an anthropological model that focuses on culture rather than a
 psychoanalytic model that focuses on the individual subject. David Scruton, in
 his anthropology of fear, Sociophobics, observes that “[f]ear 
is
 commonly  
thought of as an innate human trait, the result of the species’ phylogenetic
 development, something which is triggered by various stimuli and experienced
 in phylogenetic terms” (9-10). However, he argues against a purely biochemi
­cal-based explanation of fear; instead, he finds “biology is, in fact, nondirective”
 and that emotions occur in a cultural matrix (10). Fear, he argues, is an event
 like any emotion and as such is experienced within a “framework of social rela
­tions” (18). This means that when we experience fear, we do so as a function
 of our culture; it also means that fear has specific consequences. Scruton’s point
 here has important implications for the way theorists read emotions:
It is altogether unlikely that emotions can occur, be mediated as we have
 
described, and have no results. On the contrary, emotions do have impor
­tant consequences: they influence our behavior. They are means, in fact,
 through which society accomplishes vital tasks, for they are instrumental in
 encouraging conformity to significant behavioral and attitudinal norms of
 that society. They provide individuals with approved and accepted response
 tendencies in situations which are judged to be important.
(26)
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If the Host indeed fears the Pardoner, he does so not out of an innate response,
 
but as a culturally encoded event. But this would also mean that the Host —
 and other medieval subjects — fear the same things we do, that they are the
 products of the' same culture. Readings that assume the Host fears the Par
­doner not only rely on an ahistorical understanding of abjection but further
 reinforce fear of abjection as a cultural norm: it is as acceptable to laugh at the
 chicken as it is to fear the abject.
Other assumptions about fear make these readings dangerous. Scruton
 
notes that we tend to believe fear is an innate response to dangerous situations
and triggers a flight-or-fight mechanism. Because we see fear 
as
 a means of  
protection from danger, we tend also to judge less harshly the actions of a fear
­ful person: if the fear response is primal, then it 
is
 in some measure beyond  
rational control and originates in the drive toward self-preservation. Self
­defense 
is
 more comprehensible, and invariably more forgivable, than aggress-  
sion. Perpetuating an understanding that fear constitutes a culturally approved
 response to abjection also perpetuates a culture in which violence against
 abjected bodies is more comprehensible and thus more forgivable. When crit
­icism of The Pardoner
'
s Tale focuses on the Pardoner’s abjection as an obvious  
incitement to fear, it tacitly pardons the Host’s response. No one questions
 whether the Host responds reasonably; they know
 
he fears because they assume  
it’s normal to fear abjection. While the Pardoner thus comes under further
 scrutiny, further abjected by the writers who wish to understand him, the Host
 escapes interrogation.
The implications of such criticism, or even of laughing at a chicken joke,
 
may not appear to invoke dire consequences. But the other joke I cite at the
 beginning of this article does. In her essay on Matthew Shepard’s murder,
 Wypijewski refers to the clichéd line between love and hate to argue that such
 a line is kept strong by “all the little things of
 
a culture, mostly unnoticed and  
unremarked” (67). And when we notice those lines (on one side is love — or
 at least its possibility — acceptance, normalcy; on the other side is hatred,
 abjection, perversion), even if we notice them only to decry them, we often
 reinstantiate them: “Among those who advocate hate-crime laws, it’s always
 the sexuality of the victim that’s front and center, not the sexuality of the crim
­inal or the everyday, undifferentiated violence he took to extremity” (73).
 When the abjected body
 is
 homosexual, we have a peculiar way of naming such  
acts of violence — homophobia — that carries an excuse within its condemna
­tion. Calling such acts “phobic” means they are rooted in fear, a fear we believe
 is beyond our control and is part of our self-defense mechanism.
Both Aaron McKinney and his girlfriend, Kristen Price, wanted to rely on
 
a shared understanding that the abjected homosexual quite reasonably incites
 homophobia and thus a violent response: “presuming homophobia to be an
 acceptable alibi, [Price] thought she was helping him when she told the press
 that he and Henderson just wanted to beat [Shepard] up bad enough to teach
 him a lesson not to come on to straight people’” (Wypijewski 63). And
 although he told the police that Shepard did not hit on him, McKinney later
 wrote to someone, attempting to exonerate himself: ‘
“
Being a verry [sic] drunk  
homophobick [sic] I flipped out and began to pistol whip the fag with my gun’”
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(63). While Wypijewski repeatedly interrogates the assumptions that enable
 
such violence, her essay reveals that few others in Laramie or elsewhere do.
 Even the director of a program with the Southeast Wyoming Mental Health
 Center attributes McKinney’s actions to fear: “‘When it’s fear or hurt, which is
 typically the primary emotion at work, when you can’t say, “I’m scared shitless,”
 most hurt and fear
 
will come out in the only vehicle men are allowed. It comes  
out crooked. It looks like anger, it’s expressed as anger but it isn’t’” (quoted in
 Wypijewski 70). How does he know? We need to believe fear motivates such
 crimes because violence rooted in fear still leaves McKinney and Russell Hen
­derson as people we can in some way accept as human.
Two responses typify our reactions to the Matthew Shepard murder, the
 
Littleton, Colorado murders, the dragging death of James Byrd in Jaspar, Texas:
 one posits the killers 
as
 afraid, the other calls them monsters. We are prepared  
either to accept the crimes 
as
 understandable because the violence initiated  
from a primal response or to reject these men as not fully human. Any other
 explanation threatens our conception of humanity. Regardless of our respons
­es, of course, they are human. But to assert
 
that their violence originates in fear  
leaves an important part of our culture unexamined. At the beginning of
 
her  
essay, Wypijewski claims, quite radically, that “[i]t’s
 
just possible that Matthew  
Shepard didn’t die because he was gay; he died because Aaron McKinney and
 Russell Henderson are straight” (62). An ethical response to Matthew Shep
­ard’s murder would question not only the crime, but why McKinney and oth
­ers think that fear of abjection helps to explain, if not to excuse it.
This interrogation needs to occur in all readings of culture, including read
­
ings of literature. In January 1999, PMLA devoted an issue to ethics. While
 the articles contribute to the discussion of ethics in literary studies, not one
 article interrogates the cultural implications of how we read. Whether scenes
 like those of The Pardoner
'
s Tale merely reveal or actively produce fear matters  
less than our professional responsibility to examine the ways our reading prac
­tices may participate in normalizing violent phobias. It is the interpretation,
 not the creation, of the scene between the Host and Pardoner that should con
­cern us because it is impossible to know what motivates the Host to react as he
 does. And the gap in this text does not comprise one of the small inconse
­quential gaps Wayne Booth so engagingly ridicules; this gap 
is
 the unbridgeable  
distance between heaven and hell, with a deadly temptation in the middle —
 the temptation to assume we know what motivates others, to assume that cer
­tain emotional responses are now and have always been “normal.” Which is not
 to say critics should refrain from commenting on such stubborn texts, but their
 commentary ought to include (or at least have considered) its own assumptions
 and consequences. Sure the chicken joke 
is
 funny, but what are we doing  when  
we laugh at it, and what are we doing when we fear the Pardoner?
I would like to thank Gary Taylor, Sheree Meyer, Sharon O’Dair, Harold
 
Weber, and Elizabeth Meese for their helpful editorial comments.
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